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Abstract
Although slavery was not permitted in the Netherlands and in Britain, it was 
permitted in their colonies. The practice o f  slavery iras introduced at the 
Cape shortly after the establishment o f  the refreshment post, and ceased in 
1834, long after Britain's permanent occupation o f  the Cape.
In this article the legal position o f  the slave community at the Cape is ana­
lysed by means o f  the new insights gained from  the study o f  various sources 
in the Cape Archives.
The traditional viewpoint has been that the legal position o f  the slave com­
munity at the Cape should be evaluated in terms o f  Roman Law. There is 
some doubt, however, about whether Roman Law, albeit in an adapted 
form, was applied at the Cape during this period. The viewpoint taken in 
this article is that the legal position o f  the slaves should be evaluated 
against the background o f  the frame o f  reference fo r  law enforcement con­
tained in the Statuten van Batavia (1642) and later in the Nieuwe Statuten 
van Batavia (1766). From the analysis made o f  the legal practice at the 
Cape it appears that this frame o f  reference was not applied in respect o f  
law enforcement. It emerges, however, that the traditional viewpoint, which 
holds that Roman Law was applied, should be clearly qualified.
1. Introduction
William Wilberforce (1759), a member o f the British Parliament, described sla­
very as "... the greatest and most complicated evil by which the human race has 
ever been afflicted" (Edwards, 1942:34).
In ancient times slavery was a well-known and accepted phenomenon. In this re­
gard the Romans were no exception (cf. Van Zyl, 1977:75-78). An inevitable
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result o f the conquests leading to the establishment o f the Roman Empire was the 
presence o f slaves in great numbers (Dannenbring, 1984:84-85). Simon (1930: 
227) describes the fate o f prisoners o f war as follows:
(Slavery) was the ordinary destiny of prisoners of war if they were not 
massacred, so that their enslavement might be regarded as a milder fate than 
would otherwise be their lot (cf. Hattingh, 1990:6).
The Latin term for a slave, namely servus, indicates approval o f this modus 
operandi:
Servi autem ex eo appellati sunt, quod imperatores captivos vendere iubent 
ac per hoc servare nec occidere solent........(Inst. 1.3.3)1
Shortly after Van Riebeeck had arrived at the Cape, the slave system was in­
troduced in accordance with the policies o f the Vereenigde Geoctroyeerde Oost- 
Indische Compagnie (the V.O.C.) (Worden, 1985:6-18; Hattingh, 1990:6-8). 
The attitude o f the slave owners at the Cape towards slavery as an institution was 
strongly influenced by the fact that the V.O.C. permitted and afterwards regulated 
the slave system. They did not only accept the slave system as an officially en­
dorsed institution, but also regarded their rights in terms thereof as sacred and 
inalienable. Worden's (1985:16) report is worth repeating:
(Slavery) was perceived as an institution ordained by the ruling authority 
and accepted as such ... The first settlers accepted slaves in much the same 
way as they did land and seed. Even after slavery became well established, 
owners saw it as a system of labour maintained and supported by the go­
vernment.
It is therefore not surprising that later efforts by the British Government to im­
prove the fate o f the slaves at the Cape were vehemently resisted by the slave 
owners. It is also reported that the drive to end the slave system at the Cape was 
not supported by an Anti-Slavery Movement comparable to the movements in 
Britain (Watson, 1991:67-92). According to Watson (1991:6), this sentiment still 
has an effect on modem thinking in South Africa. Watson remarks that:
(His study) does maintain that one principal source was the failure of early 
South African liberalism to develop over a century and a half either a sys­
tematic and comprehensive ideology of human rights or a coherent move­
ment to oppose the steady reduction of the rights of South Africans ... This 
failure, I believe, began with the Cape’s antislavery movement itself.
1 See alsoZ) 1.5.4.2, D 1.5.5.1.
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The only organised effort by whites to curb the effect o f slavery at the Cape was 
the inception o f the Cape o f Good Hope Philanthropic Society for Aiding De­
serving Slaves to Purchase their Freedom on 27 June 1828. The activities o f the 
Society were sanctioned by Proclamation 70 o f 3 February 1830 (Watson, 1991: 
67-92). The Society’s contribution towards the ending o f slavery at the Cape was 
a limited one. Not only did the Society allow its members to own slaves, but it 
also refrained from attacking the validity o f slave property and from exposing the 
contradiction between Christian principles and slavery. It is also remarkable that 
the public debate on slavery at the Cape was a practical, and largely strategic, 
discussion. This discussion accepted the philosophical underpinning that proper­
ty in humans was legitimate and that the right to liberty was subordinate to the 
right to property and the concomitant need to a secure labour supply. The diffi­
culties experienced by clergymen to transform the debate to one regarding moral 
principles is aptly described by Watson (1991:193-194) as follows:
Their views were complicated by the ideologies o f their denomination or 
mission society, by the tensions between their secular and spiritual roles, 
and by their personal relations with their parishioners, both black and white.
Apart from the attitude o f  the colonists at the Cape towards slavery, it is also im­
portant to emphasise that there was a considerable difference between the de fa c ­
to and de ju re  position o f the slaves.
Ross’s (1980:5) comments on the early legal system at the Cape caught my atten­
tion. He remarks:
South Africa was clearly ruled by a code of law ... and moreover by one 
which was based on a system to which more concentrated legal thought had 
been given, at a higher theoretical level, than any other in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.
Slaves were not without any rights. Their limited rights were, however, suppres­
sed by the realities to which they were subjected. Worden (1985:113) refers to 
one aspect o f their subjugation in the following terms:
(T)here were numerous means of evading the laws which were supposed to 
protect slave interests. As Le Vaillant commented after his visit in the early 
1780’s, these wise laws do honour to the Dutch government, but how many 
ways are there to elude them.
Slaves themselves were under real pressure when it came to the enforcement of 
their limited rights. For instance the Statutes o f  Batavia (1766), which were ap­
plied at the Cape, allowed slaves to report maltreatment and abuse, but also 
stipulated that when a complaint was unfounded, the slave would be whipped and
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returned to its master.2 The realities slaves faced at the courts, combined with the 
effect that a complaint would have on the master-slave relationship at home, 
forces one to conclude that only the most severe cases o f  maltreatment were 
reported (Ross, 1980:7; Dooling, 1991:80). I support the view expressed by 
Ross (1983:1)
(T)here has never been ... a (slave) society that was not brutal in the 
extreme. A mild slave regime is a contradiction in terms. Slavery is a form 
of social oppression that is based on the use of force, which is always 
available to, and frequently employed by the slave-owning class to impress 
its will on the slaves. If, somewhere in the world, there exists a social 
institution that is called slavery in which brutality and denigration are 
absent, then the concept has been stretched so far as to be empty and 
meaningless...
2. Proposed legal framework
Van Riebeeck came to the Cape as an employee o f  the V.O.C. The V.O.C. was 
a company that received its Charter from the State-General in 1602. The Cape 
remained under the authority o f the V.O.C. until 1795 when it was occupied by 
the British for the first time. The V.O.C. was dissolved during this time and 
when the British returned the Cape in 1803, it came under the authority o f  the 
Batavian Republic. In 1806 the British reoccupied the Cape, this time on a more 
permanent basis (Visagie, 1969:1-13,40-41,98-99).
It is important to note that slavery w as not permitted in the Netherlands (De 
Groot, 1952 1.4.2; Van Leeuwen, 1708 1.5.4; Van der Linden Inst. 1.2.3) and 
Britain.3 Slavery was, however, tolerated in their respective colonies, and history 
testifies that both countries and their citizens were deeply involved in the Atlantic 
slave trade (Postma, 1990:10 ff., Anstey, 1975:3 ff.). This fact would cause great 
difficulties for the British Government in its drive to end the slave trade and 
slavery (Hurwitz, 1973:48-76; Clarkson, 1968 1:1 ff) .
Comments on the legal position o f  the slaves at the Cape must account for the 
various sources o f  the early Cape law.
It is well-known that the Charter o f  the V.O.C. did not specify which law the 
company should apply in the territories under its control (Visagie, 1969:24-39; 
Van Zyl, 1907: 132, 135-138). Neither did the Charter grant the V.O.C. any 
legislative power (De Vos, 1992:227. Contra: Swanepoel, 1958:7, 14). The
2 Vgl. Van dcr Chijs, 1891:9. 576. 14.
3 Sommersett v Stuart 20 How Street Tr 1 (1771-1772).
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uncertainty resulting from this situation has received attention from many legal 
historians. Authoritative sources now accept that in the early judicial processes 
reference was made to the law as it was applied in East-India (Visagie, 1969:69). 
Due to this development, Roman Dutch law became the basis o f the legal system 
in South Africa (Van Zyl, 1983:420 ff.).
Although no legislative powers were vested in the V.O.C., it produced the Sta­
tutes o f  Batavia  (1642) and the New Statutes o f  Batavia (1766). These statutes 
as well as later Resolutions o f the Council o f India were destined to be applied in 
V.O.C. territories. Since these statutes and resolutions were not ratified by the 
State-General, it is often argued that they were ultra vires (Visagie, 1969:29-36; 
Roos, 1897:4-9; Van Zyl, 1907:132-147, 241-258, 366-383). Be that as it may, 
both the Statutes o f  Batavia (1642) and the New Statutes o f  Batavia (1766) were 
enforced at the Cape.4 The New Statutes o f  Batavia were actually applied in the 
so-called ‘Alphabetical’ version thereof which were compiled at the Cape.5 
There is also substantial evidence that the Resolutions o f  the Council o f  India, o f 
a later date than the New Statutes o f  Batavia (1766), were enforced6 at the Cape.
It is generally accepted that the legal position o f  the slaves at the Cape was go­
verned by the principles o f  Roman law, albeit in a veiy modified form (Visagie, 
1969:89; Stock, 1915:330-331). The view is also expressed that the principles of 
Roman law did not apply when they were not reconcilable with local placaats and 
circumstances (Dooling, 1991:129).
The application o f the principles o f Roman Law to the slaves at the Cape appears 
to be sound, because Roman Dutch law was imported into South Africa as the 
basis o f the legal system (Van Zyl, 1983:402 ff.). A closer analysis o f  the Sta­
tutes o f  Batavia and the New Statutes o f  Batavia, however indicates that, as far as 
the slaves were concerned, a broader legal framework dictated the application o f 
the principles o f  Roman law.
According to the preamble to these Statutes its provisions should receive pre­
cedence over local placaats. It is also regulated that the position o f  slaves should 
be determined by the provisions o f the Statutes under the heading o f lijfeigenen. 
It is only when the Statutes remain silent on any point that the position o f  slaves
F.ksteen v Denyssen qq Eva van de Kaap C J  1556 (457-740) C J  932 (273-274), 494; 
City v Klerk G H  48.2.24 (558-747), G H  48.1.1 (261-262) 576-577.
5 City v Klerk G H  48.2.24 (558-747), G H  48.1.1 (261-262) 576-577; Stock, 1915:328, 
336.
® For example the Resolution o f the Council o f  India dated 10 April 1770 which was 
repealed at the Cape by the Proclamation of 19 October 1812,
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should be determined by the "beschreevene Keyserlyke wetten en regten" (Ro­
man law).7
It is therefore submitted that it is incorrect to refer only to the application o f the 
principles o f Roman law to the slaves at the Cape. This simplistic view does not 
take into account the legal framework dictating the application o f  the principles o f 
Roman law as specified in the Statutes. It also tends to lose sight o f  the fact that 
substantial aspects o f Roman slave law were incorporated in the Statutes, albeit 
in a modified form (De Beer, 1992:124-131).
In practice, however, the legal framework as prescribed by the Statutes was not 
adhered to at the Cape. The Fiscal/Attorney-General prescribed his own frame­
work which was incompatible with that o f the Statutes (Theal, 1899:IX 146). He 
advocated the following precedence:
* The laws directed at the slave community which had been made and promul­
gated by the Colonial Government.
* The collection o f laws under the title o f lijfeigenen o f the Statutes o f  Dutch 
India, in so far as they were not contrary to the existing laws o f the Colonial 
Government; and finally
* Roman law in so far as it was not contrary to the Colonial Law, the Statutes 
o f  India, or the spirit o f modem jurisprudence.
The Fiscal/Attomey-General was a very important and sometimes controversial 
official. Theal (1899 XXXIII:62-70) describes the powers o f  the Fiscal/Attomey- 
General as follows:
(H)e was enjoined to maintain and protect before the Court o f Justice the 
greatness and power of the Batavian Government and of all High and Low 
Legal Authorities appointed for the direction of public affairs in the Colony 
of the Cape, and further defend the Property, Means and Revenue, rights 
and privilege of the Government against all fraud, contravention, and spo­
liation whatever by whomsoever attempted and this either as Prosecutor or 
Defendant.
The key and important role played by the Fiscal/Attomey-General in the ad­
ministration o f  justice urges one to conclude that in practice the legal framework 
he proposed did have some authority.
Par. 89 New Statutes o f  Batavia (1766); Par. 86 New Statutes o f  Batavia (Alphabetical 
Version).
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Apart from the Fiscal/Attomey-General’s view, cognisance must be taken o f a 
decision taken by the Political Council at the Cape on 12 February 1715. This 
decision empowered the Court to enforce the Statutes o f  Batavia, but only in so 
far as the Statutes are not incompatible with the local placaats, ordinances and 
resolutions o f the local Government. According to Stock (1915:328), consi­
derable stress was laid in later years upon the Resolution o f 1715 and its impor­
tance seems to have been greatly exaggerated. This Resolution was in fact mere­
ly a reply to a letter from the Court o f Justice requesting an indication on the ap­
plicability o f the Statutes.
Before any final conclusion is drawn, it is essential that the legal practice at the 
courts o f law be examined. Prudence is the mother o f wisdom -  this truism is 
also applicable when it comes to conclusions drawn from the records o f these ear­
ly court cases.
Up to approximately 1827 the Court o f Justice and the Court o f Appeal did not 
record the reasons for their judgments (Botha, 1915:319, 323; Visagie, 1969:70). 
It is therefore almost impossible to comment on the legality o f the submissions of 
counsel which, incidently, was documented in extenso, and in many cases sub­
stantiated with full details o f relevant authorities. Until recently the accessibility 
of the records o f the Court o f Justice and the Court o f  Appeal also proved to be a 
major stumbling-block. Legal historians had to cope with the time-consuming 
and almost impossible task o f  working at random through the available and un- 
systematised documents and series.
A very useful and, in my opinion, indispensable tool was developed by the re­
search team from UW C-PU for CHE for this purpose. This team recently pro­
duced an index o f  the civil cases o f the Court o f Justice and the Court o f  Appeal 
from 1806 to 1827. This computer based index allows legal historians direct ac­
cess to the documents containing the relevant data on any predetermined subject.
From the submissions o f  counsel before the respective courts it is apparent that 
they accepted the applicability o f  the Statutes o f  Batavia to the slaves.8 From the 
detail references o f  counsel it is clear that the Alphabetical Version o f the New 
Statutes o f  Batavia  was used.9 The Resolutions o f  the Council o f  India which 
appeared later than the New Statutes o f  Batavia were also used by counsel to
8 Munnik v Truter qq Hendrik C J  1643 (139-311), C J  2232 (359-361), 266-267; 
Denyssen v Beck C J  1620 (1-980), C J  2227 (570-571), 698-700.
9 City v Klerk G H  48.2.24 (558-747), G / /  48.1.1 (261-262), 576-577.
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support their arguments.10 There is evidence that counsel was aware o f  the legal 
framework dictating the application o f Roman law as prescribed by the Statutes 
References to the Resolution o f  the Political Council o f  1715 also received some 
prominence.12
It therefore appears that the legal framework as prescribed by the Statutes did not 
receive the required attention. It is also fair to conclude that with the support o f 
the Attorney-General the Resolution o f  the Political Council o f  1715 had an im­
pact on legal thinking.
Apart from the uncertainty surrounding the legal framework there was no doubt 
about the relevant legal principles to which the slaves were subjected. Before 
moving to the changes brought about by the British since 1806, it would serve the 
purposes o f this paper to summarise the situation that confronted them:
* The basic principles o f  Roman law were still relevant, either in their ‘co­
dified’ form as part o f the Statutes, or in their subsidiary role as part o f  the 
"beschreevene Keyserlyke W etten en Regten". There are indications, how­
ever, that Roman law was not upheld in all respects at the Cape.
* In addition, both the Statutes o f  Batavia  and the local placaats contain a 
large number o f  provisions aimed at the local needs and day to day life o f 
the slave community.
* Although definite slave rights were enshrined in legislation, the precarious 
position o f  the slaves in general, and before the courts in particular, was evi­
dent.
3. Developments: 1806 to 1834
When the British reoccupied the Cape in 1806 they pursued their well-known 
policy in respect o f  conquered or ceded colonies (Visagie, 1969:95-97; Van Zyl, 
1907:132-135). For the Cape this policy meant that justice was to be adminis­
tered in the same manner as had been customary until then, and according to the 
laws, statutes and ordinances which had been in force.
10 Spade v Stout C J  1743 (1 -129), C J  939 (659-660), 117-123.
11 Eksteen v Denyssen qq Eva van de Kaap C J  1556 (457-740) C J  932 (273-274) 494, 
550-551.
12 Denyssen v Beck C J  1620 (1-980), C J  2227 (570-571) 698-700.
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At this stage the British Government was under great pressure from the Anti-Sla­
very Movement to end slave trade in its territories. This was legislated in 1807, 
while the Anti-Slavery Movement continued their campaign now focusing on the 
abolition o f all slavery (Hurwitz, 1973:21-76; Edwards, 1942:33-63, 81-90, 111- 
150).
As indicated above, the British authorities had to take cognisance o f various 
sources o f the slave law at the Cape in their efforts to accommodate the interests 
o f the slave community. There is definite proof that they took up this challenge. 
Not only were the Fiscal and Attorney-General requested to provide details o f the 
legal position o f  the slaves13, but at least two sets o f documents in the Cape 
A rchives14 also prove that the authorities had the desire to acquaint themselves 
with the details o f  the relevant provisions. In the Archives there is a handwritten 
copy o f  the Alphabetical Version o f  the New Statutes o f  Batavia in English as 
well as a list o f the local placaats relevant to the slave community.
The British efforts to limit the number o f slaves at the Cape date back to 1795. 
During the British occupation o f 1795 to 1803 special permission, which was 
granted only under special circumstances, was required for the importation of 
slaves (Latsky, 1943:5-8; Stockenstróm, 1934:23-29; Edwards, 1942:34-36, 47- 
54). After slave trade had been prohibited in British territories in 1807 (Clarkson, 
1968:Vol II 506-508, 576-587), the Government at the Cape had to attend to the 
real danger o f  the enslavement o f  the indigenous people. This threat urged the 
authorities to promulgate a  number o f  ordinances15 which legislated the 
movement, employment, land ownership and residence o f  the Khoisan. As 
pressure mounted from the Anti-Slavery Movement in Britain and its affiliates at 
the Cape, these laws became controversial, and were often described as justifying 
the slavery o f  indigenous people (Edwards, 1942:51-63; Van der Merwe, 1984: 
149-151). There can be little doubt that these early laws introduced into our 
history the concept o f  group areas and pass laws.
On the other hand, efforts were made by o f  the British Government to improve 
the fate o f  the slave community. To the dismay o f local slave owners a number o f
'3  See the reports of Attorney-General Denyssen of 16 March 1813 and 26 April 1813 in 
Theal Records IX 146-161, 170-174. As early as 29 November 1797 the Fiscal was 
requested to supply answers to the questions of Earl Macartney regarding the legal position 
of slaves at the Cape.
14 Cape Archives S O 7/35, 17/1.
15 For instance the Proclamation of 1 November 1809 (repealed by Ordinance 50 of 1828); 
Ordinance 49 o f 14 July 1828.
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Proclamations were promulgated in pursuance o f this goal.16 One o f the most 
important changes that were introduced, was the introduction o f the system of 
Slave Protectors and Guardians.17 Mason (1991:108) describes the effect o f this 
system on the master-slave relationship as follows:
Since these men were independent of, and superior to the masters, the law 
struck at the heart of the master-slave relationship. It undercut the slave­
holders pretensions of being the sole source of protection, discipline and 
indulgence for their slaves.
The Guardian o f Slaves had to assist slaves in legal proceedings:
... wherein any Slave may be charged with any offence punishable by 
Death, Banishment, or Transportation; or wherein any question may arise as 
to the right of any alleged Slave to Freedom; or wherein any Person may be 
charged with the Murder of any Slave, or with any offence against the 
person of any Slave; or wherein any question may arise respecting the right 
of any Slave to any such Property as he or she is ... declared competent to 
acquire.18
The effectiveness o f this system was restricted by the fact that the Protector or 
Guardian only reacted to the complaints lodged by slaves, who in turn were 
subjected to the serious consequences o f  unfounded accusations and various other 
retaliatory measures o f slave owners (Mason, 1991:109-115).
The compulsory registration o f  slaves was also legislated.19 This legislation 
proved to be impractical and caused resentment among the slave-owning com­
munity (Latsky, 1943:27-29).20 Their opposition was aggravated because the 
Court o f Justice was instructed to take into account the fact whether or not a 
slave was registered when his or her freedom was at stake. This legislation did 
not contribute substantially towards the improvement o f  the position o f the slave
16 See for instance the Proclamation of 26 April 1816; the Proclamation of 18 March 1823; 
Ordinance 19 of 1826 and the Consolidated Order of 1830.
17 Par. 2-7 Ordinance 19 of 19 June 1826; Par. 2-8 Consolidated Order of 1830.
18 Par. 7 Ordinance 19 of 19 June 1826.
19 Par. 1-12 Proclamation 26 April 1816.
2® The ratio for this Proclamation, as given in the preamble thereof, was to protect in­
digenous people from being subjected to slavery.
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community. Slave registers proved to be outdated and unreliable while the 
unenviable position o f slaves before the courts remained essentially unchanged.
The efforts o f the British authorities were, however, not without success. The 
moves towards the recognition o f slave marriages and their families were a major 
step in the process o f humanizing the position o f slaves.21 Slave marriages were 
eventually even allowed against the will and without the permission of the slave 
owner. In addition, slaves obtained the restricted right to acquire and own pro­
perty and to dispose thereof22
The right o f  the slave owner to his property (slaves) and to their labour was 
regarded as inalienable and sacred. The right acquired by a slave to buy his free­
dom, even against the wish o f his owner, was therefore experienced as a  serious 
inroad into the inalienable right o f ownership which even primitive societies 
uphold.23
The master-slave relationship was dealt a severe blow by the restriction placed on 
owners regarding the working hours o f  slaves24 and the corporal punishment of 
their slaves.25
To support these measures, serious efforts were made to ensure that the rights o f 
the slave community would be upheld. The admissibility o f  the testimony of 
slaves in judicial proceedings was reformed,26 the Guardian o f  Slaves was com­
pelled to pursue all complaints lodged by or on behalf o f  slaves 27
Clearly the aim o f the British authorities was to undermine the philosophical and 
practical foundations on which slavery was based and to protect slaves from the
Par. 5-9 Proclamation of 18 March 1823; par. 21 Ordinance 19 of 19 June 1826.
^  Par. 13 Proclamation of 18 March 1823; par. 28-32 Ordinance 19 of 19 June 1826.
^  Par 33-38 Ordinance 19ofl9Junc 1826, par. 56-62 Consolidated Order of 1830.
24
Par. 1,11 and 16 Proclamation of 18 March 1823.
25
Par. 17-22 Proclamation of 18 March 1823; par. 13, 16-17 Ordinance 19 of 19 June 
1826; par. 4-6, 21-28 Consolidated Order 1830.
^  Par. 39 Ordinance 19 of 19 June 1826; par. 80 Consolidated Order 1830.
^  Par. 17 Ordinance 19of 19 June 1826; par. 11 Consolidated Order 1830.
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heartless behaviour o f their owners. The heart o f the slave system was, however, 
left untouched. The legislature was reluctant to make any substantial inroad into 
the property rights o f slave owners.28 The authorities’ reluctance to remove the 
provisions condemning slaves when a complaint against their masters was ruled 
to be unfounded29 proved to be a major stumbling-block in the execution o f  slave 
rights at the Cape. It became evident that the predicament o f the slave com­
munity would only be resolved by the total abolition o f  slavery.
On 1 December 1834 slavery became illegal in British territories.30 It was, how­
ever, replaced by a system o f apprenticeships31 which, on the pretext o f ensuring 
training and jobs for slaves and labour for the colonists, boiled down to a con­
tinuation o f the slave system albeit in a more respectable form (Edwards, 
1942:117-214; Simon, 1930:216-217; Lovejoy, 1983:233-234). This prolonged 
harassment o f the former slave community ended in 1838 when the system of 
apprenticeships was finally abolished.
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